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CEPAL REVIEW No. 26 
The Revival of 
American 
Hegemony 
Maria da Conceição 
Tavares* 
One of the most striking features of international 
economic and political relations in recent years has 
been the revival of United States power in the Western 
world. After a couple of decades in which a situation of 
multipolarity seemed to be consolidating itself in the 
structure of the relations among the developed capi-
talist countries, there is once again a concentration of 
power in the hands of the country which, of course, 
has been for many years now the main centre of the 
world economy. 
The author of this article, a leading Brazilian econ-
omist, describes the main milestone in this process, 
which is a direct result of the policy pursued by the 
United States since 1979. This policy is a combination 
of an expansionary fiscal policy and a restrictive 
monetary policy which raises interest rates and attracts 
international financial flows to the country. In the 
author's opinion, the overriding weight of this policy 
has meant that the other industrialized countries 
—whatever their political orientation— have had to 
redirect their own policies to bring them into line with 
the policy of the United States, thus demonstrating the 
central role of the United States in the world order. 
After analysing the important effects which this 
policy is producing both within and outside the United 
States, she considers the likelihood of its being main-
tained in the future and the way in which ¡t would 
affect the policy options of the countries of Latin 
Amer ica , especially Brazil , with respect to in-
ternational financial and trade relations. 
•Professor in the Faculty of Economics at the University of 
Rio de Janeiro. A preliminary version of the ideas discussed in 
this article was presented at a meeting sponsored by the In-
stitute of International Relations of the Papal Catholic Uni-
versity of Rio de Janeiro in September 1984. 
Up to 1980 or 1981 it would not have been 
reasonable to suppose that the United States 
would succeed in reasserting its hegemony over 
its Western competitors, much less move towards 
a new international economic order and a new 
division of labour under its control. Today it is 
quite likely that this will happen. 
Until the end of the 1980s it could not be 
foreseen that the United States would be capable 
of bringing into line two countries of strategic 
importance in the capitalist system: Japan and 
West Germany. If the United States had not suc-
ceeded in molding the private Japanese economy 
to its set of interests and if British and German 
policy had not been so conservative, the United 
States would have had to confront two blocks, 
European and Asian, with claims to economic 
independence. It must be stressed that at the 
time the interests at stake were so obviously in 
conflict that the world trends were polycentric, 
and it seemed impossible for the United States to 
succeed in reasserting its hegemony, although it 
continued to be the dominant power. 
Other general circumstances of the 1970s 
seemed to confirm this argument. The private 
banking system was totally beyond the control of 
the central banks, in particular the Federal Re-
serve Bank (FED). The subsystem of transnational 
subsidiaries was operating on the basis of region-
al divisions of labour among enterprises, con-
trary to United States interests, which sharpened 
intercapitalist competition to the detriment of 
the United States. 
In short, the existence of a world economy 
that lacked a hegemonic pole was leading to the 
dismantling of the existing post-war order and 
the decentralization of private and regional in-
terests. 
Developments in United States domestic and 
foreign economic policy, from 1979 to the pres-
ent, were aimed at reversing these trends and 
regaining international financial control by 
means of so-called strong-dollar diplomacy. 
As is generally known, the Chairman of the 
FED, at the end of the last IMF meeting in 1979, 
stated that he was not in agreement with the 
proposals of the IMF and the other member 
countries for the maintenance of a devalued dol-
lar and introduction of a new international 
monetary standard. He added that the United 
States would not allow the dollar to continue to 
decline, as had been happening since 1970 and in 
particular since the collapse of the Smithsonian 
Agreement in 1973. Following on this abrupt 
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change of position, the United States announced 
that the dollar would be kept as an international 
standard and that the hegemony of its currency 
would be restored. This restoration of the FED'S 
financial power meant that the United States it-
self and the whole world economy were to sink 
into an unbroken recession which lasted three 
years. Furthermore, several large corporations 
and a few American banks failed, and indeed the 
whole United States economy was subjected to 
severe structural strain. The beginning of the 
recession and the sharp increase in interest rates 
were decisive factors in the electoral defeat of 
President Carter. 
Reviewing what happened with the benefit 
of hindsight, it can be argued that the Reagan 
Government's economic policy (subsequent to 
these events) was not absurd from the standpoint 
of the national interests of the United States—as 
almost all economists had proclaimed at the time 
of its formulation— even though it had brought a 
truly "imperial" pressure to bear on the rest of 
the world. It was in fact a very contradictory 
policy, not derived from any "international con-
spiracy" nor even from a solid national con-
sensus. Indeed, no such consensus was possible 
when the United States Treasury Department 
had one policy and the FED another; when the 
California group held certain ideas and the Mid-
dle West and the East Coast other quite different 
ones. In short, as a result of an intense conflict of 
interests and domestic disagreements, the United 
States applied, and is still applying, a multi-
faceted policy entailing the launching of a pro-
cess of economic recovery of a peculiar kind, 
one that was almost inconceivable at the begin-
ning of the 1980s. 
In fact, in addition to the campaign for the 
restoration of political and ideological prestige, 
Reagan had in mind something unheard of, 
namely, a spurious, upside-down Keynesian poli-
cy combined with hard-line monetarism. To re-
distribute income to the richest, increase the fis-
cal deficit and hoist the interest rate is an ex-
plosive combination of economic policies, from 
the domestic as well as the international stand-
point. In spite of everything, this contradictory 
policy resulted in the recovery of the United 
States economy to the extent that this country 
managed to influence its allies and throw down 
an economic challenge to its foes. 
On the other hand, by maintaining a strict 
monetary policy and forcing the overvaluation of 
the dollar the FED was in fact able to regain con-
trol of the international private banking system 
and manipulate to its advantage a broad range of 
different interests. In fact, after the turnabout 
announced by the FED Chairman, followed by the 
Polish crash, this system was first compelled to 
clamp down on lending almost immediately, 
thereby putting a brake on operations in the in-
ter-bank market and, more importantly, on the 
expansion of lending for the countries on the 
periphery. The cutback in lending was even 
more abrupt following the Mexican crisis, for on 
that occasion the private banking system pan-
icked and took shelter in the big financial mar-
kets. From that moment the flow of inter-bank 
lending was definitely directed towards the Uni-
ted States, and the banking system was under the 
FED'S control. And not only under the control of 
monetary policy, which dictates the rules of the 
game, and of fluctuations in the interest and 
exchange rates, but also at the service of Amer-
ican fiscal policy. Since the beginning of the 
1980s all the big international banks have been 
operating in New York, not just sheltering under 
the FED'S wing but compelled —because they had 
no other remedy— to finance the American fiscal 
deficit. 
All this may seem very strange. But the truth 
is that today we are witnessing the following 
situation : the United States has a fiscal deficit of a 
structural kind, and its inability to reduce this 
deficit arises from its own financial and military 
policies. The financial element in the deficit is 
increasing, simply because of the "rolling-over" 
of the public debt which has caused it to double in 
barely three years. In 1984 the public debt 
amounted to approximately US $1 300 000, a fig-
ure close to the total amount in circulation in the 
international inter-bank market. This debt is the 
only tool with which the United States can 
achieve the necessary tapping of international 
liquidity and attract Japanese and European 
banking capital towards the American money 
market. 
Up to 1981 only the United Kingdom was 
pursuing an economic policy openly in support 
of the American currency. The Japanese had a 
real possibility of following an independent 
monetary policy and they resisted the adoption 
T H E REVIVAL OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY/ Maria da Conceição Tavares 141 
of neoconservative policies out of the monetarist 
prescription book. Several other countries, such 
as France and Austria and the Northern Eu-
ropean nations, and even Brazil itself, also tried 
to resist falling automatically into line with the 
orthodox economic policy. They all knew clearly, 
from 1979 to 1981, that they must not comply, 
but they were nevertheless brought under con-
trol. All the developed countries of the world, 
whatever the colour of their Governments 
—socialist, social democratic, conservative, etc.— 
are practically in alignment in terms of ex-
change-rate policy, interest-rate policy, mone-
tary policy and fiscal policy. Consequently, all 
growth rates, all exchange rates and all interest 
rates are centered on the performance of these 
variables in the sphere of the American econ-
omy. 
In these circumstances all these countries 
have been compelled to pursue tight monetary 
and fiscal policies and to maintain increasing 
trade surpluses which stifle their national growth 
potential and transform their public deficits into 
structural financial deficits that are useless for 
the purposes of policies of economic reflation. 
The way in which Japan's economic policy 
was brought into line was impressive, even 
dramatic. Throughout the post-war period this 
country was the most heterodox in matters of 
economic policy. It invested on short-term 
borrowing and pursued a loose monetary policy; 
it surrounded its business system with an 
apparently impossible risk structure; it made lit-
tle use of the securities market or of public debt; 
in short, it produced its own national develop-
ment model. In 1975 it tried to carry out an 
internal readjustment plan in keeping with its 
potential, but it was gradually forced to abandon 
all that and today it is totally under the influence 
of the dynamics of the American economy. Japan 
is not following an independent development 
policy, except with regard to the minimum in-
ternal security of its society. The larger part of 
Japan's banking and transnational capital is tied 
to United States recovery plans; it has enormous 
exportable surpluses but no prospect of resum-
ing its historical investment and growth rates. 
This means that the Japanese financial market is 
inextricably linked to the American, saving some 
accidental breakdown between 1985 and 1987 in 
the United States banking system and a sudden 
devaluation of the dollar —the only point at 
which there is still a possibility of an upheaval 
that could shake American hegemony. 
A little while ago, everything indicated that 
the United States had lost the capacity to lead the 
world in a beneficial way, and this is still true. 
But, in contrast, between 1979 and 1983 the 
Americans gave indisputable proof of their abil-
ity, not always beneficial, to exercise their hege-
mony and bend all other countries to their will by 
means of recession. 
Since 1984, in the very words of its financial 
élite, the United States has been establishing a 
new international division oflabour and boasts of 
being the "trade locomotive" of world recovery. ' 
One fundamental aspect of this process of 
restoration of the dominant position of the Uni-
ted States stands out in an analysis of the coun-
try's economic relations. Between 1982 and 1984 
the United States doubled its trade deficit every 
year, and this fact, together with interest receipts, 
enabled it to absorb real transfers of savings from 
the rest of the world which in 1983 alone 
amounted to US$ 100 000 million and in 1984 
should have exceeded US$ 150 000 million. On 
the other hand, its terms of trade improved and 
its domestic costs declined, for its imports are the 
best and the cheapest in the world. Thus, without 
making an intensive savings and investment 
effort, without touching its energy infra-
structure, without touching its agriculture or old 
heavy industry, the United States is modernizing 
its high-technology industry with cheap equip-
ment of the most advanced kind and with ven-
ture capital from Japan, West Germany and the 
rest of Europe and the world. 
The structure of United States trade was al-
ways symmetrical and closed. It exported raw 
materials, foodstuffs, industrial inputs and capi-
tal goods, i.e., all the important items of in-
ternational trade. The United States economic 
relations with the rest of the world could not be 
contained within the traditional centre-
periphery arrangement. There had to be an in-
ternational division oflabour which favoured the 
United States in absolute or relative terms. The 
surprising fact is that now it is seeking to establish 
an international division oflabour that works to 
'See Morgan Guarantee Trust: World Financial Markets, 
September, 1984. 
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its own exclusive advantage. After having ex-
ported to the rest of the world for more than two 
decades through the transnationals the tech-
nological pattern of the American industrial sys-
tem, it is using its hegemonic power to rebuild its 
position as dominant technological centre. It 
makes use of its banks, trade and finance and of 
direct foreign investments to achieve redeploy-
ment, despite having lost the trade race to the 
other developed economies and even some semi-
industrialized ones. 
The United States is now investing heavily in 
the tertiary sector and in the new advanced-
technology industries. It is sufficient to examine 
the investment structure in 1983 and 1984 to 
realize the extraordinary concentration of invest-
ment expenditure in the field of information 
technology, biotechnology and sophisticated ser-
vices. The United States is not interested in pre-
serving its old structure. Moreover, it knows that 
it does not have the capacity to bring about a 
boom by reforming the industrial sectors which 
lead the way in post-war economic growth. On 
the contrary, The United States is concentrating 
its efforts on the high-technology sectors and is 
leaving its old industries open to international 
competition from its partners. 
With its enormous trade deficits and the 
resumption of growth, the United States can be 
sure of the support of its exporter partners, es-
pecially Japan and West Germany. With its high 
real interest rates it finances the support of the 
bankers. And with joint ventures within the Uni-
ted States it ensures its leading position for the 
future, in addition to helping the recovery of its 
domestic economy. 
It must be stressed that the recovery of the 
American economy is being achieved by means 
of short-term borrowing and with growing in-
debtedness. In actual fact the Americans are 
using the same technique that Brazil and Mexico 
recently used and which Japan used in the 1950s. 
The United States finally discovered the Latin 
American and Japanese development technique: 
financing investment by means of short-term 
borrowing, foreign debt and fiscal deficits. And 
since its currency is dominant and overvalued, 
the American economy has no inflation. This is 
indeed a very puzzling situation for economists, 
for if what the monetarists or Keynesians or any 
traditional textbook say is correct, the United 
States should already be experiencing galloping 
inflation because of the tremendous demand 
pressure engendered by a heterodox economic 
policy. 
Budget policy provides an example of this 
heterodox approach. The United States has 
practically halted expenditure on public goods 
and services and has increased expenditure in 
the armaments sector, cutting back welfare ex-
penditure accordingly. In short, it has swapped 
social welfare for weapons and has carried 
through a redistribution of income to the rich. In 
addition, it has reduced the tax burden on the 
middle class and introduced almost full tax relief 
on interest paid to banks in connection with 
purchases of consumer durables. It has also en-
couraged faster depreciation of the assets and 
refinancing of the liabilities of certain compa-
nies. In these circumstances personal debt has 
been transformed into good business, for part of 
the financial cost of the debt can be set against 
income tax. Accordingly, short-term borrowing 
has been used on a large scale for the purchase of 
houses and consumer durables. Similar methods 
have been used to finance investments in the 
tertiary sector and high-technology industry 
which do not take long to come to fruition and 
whose expected rate of return is much higher 
than the nominal interest rate, which is showing a 
tendency to decline. There are apparently three 
interrelated reasons for this drop in interest 
rates: the absorption of international capital, the 
FED'S less orthodox position and the decline in 
inflation. This latter phenomenon is due in turn 
to the decline in domestic costs resulting from the 
overvaluation of the dollar and competition from 
imports, which have produced an improvement 
in the relationship of trade prices in favour of 
wage-earners' purchasing power. 
Many people hoped that from 1983 the Uni-
ted States would revert to an overall balance-of-
payments surplus, since from 1982 the income 
earned by American capital abroad did not cover 
the current-account deficit. This was not, howev-
er, to happen, because the influx of foreign capit-
al comfortably covered the deficit. The invest-
ment of venture capital also increased. For ex-
ample, Japan alone invested US$ 10 000 million 
during the recovery period and is plannig to 
invest a further US$ 40 000 million before the 
end of the decade. West Germany, for its part, 
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will probably have invested approximately 
US$ 8 000 to US$ 9 000 million, although the 
exact total is not available. In short, all of Europe 
and Japan are investing in the-United States; the 
United States, meanwhile is taking back part of 
the capital of subsidiaries of the American trans-
nationals which have no capacity for further ex-
pansion in the rest of the world. Finally, while the 
peripheral countries remain at a standstill and 
the rest of the world has a growth rate of 1 to 2%. 
The United States grew at a rate of 7 to 8% in 
1983-1984., 
Buttressed by this enormous influx of capi-
tal, the United States could continue with a trade 
deficit whose limits are still not in sight. From 
US$30 000 million in 1982 it climbed to 
US$ 60 000 million in 1983 and jumped to over 
US$ 120 000 million in 1984. In 1985 it might 
well reach US$ 200 000 million and it may con-
tinue to increase unless a deliberate brake is put 
on the American economy, simply because there 
is surplus capital in the world. This surplus of 
capital and "external savings" is due to the fact 
that the rest of the world has been sticking to 
conservative policies, whatever the Government 
in power. In fact, the universality of orthodox 
policies has compelled all countries to maintain 
low investment and growth rates and to increase 
export rates. As a reflection of the forced adjust-
ment, all the countries of the world have balance-
of-trade surpluses. All except the United States. 
The United States is opening up its economy 
and in so doing stimulates a massive transfer of 
income and capital from the rest of the world to 
the United States. One very important point is 
that this makes it possible to close the structural 
financial deficit in the public sector. It all hap-
pens as if every time the FKD issues bonds to 
finance the national debt, it can be certain that 
they will be taken up by all the world's banking 
institutions and rentiers. The essential fact is that 
the whole world is financing not just the United 
States Treasury Department, especially its finan-
cial element, but also American consumers and 
investors. This time, and in contrast to what hap-
pened in the 1970s, there has been a transfer of 
real savings and not just of loans, liquidity and 
speculative capital. 
Another question on which light needs to be 
shed is the influence of interest rates on invest-
ment. Many people argue that the high level of 
real interest rates will put a brake on investment 
sooner or later. It is obvious that the Americans 
are not financing investment in the capital mar-
ket. There is no market in new capital; the mar-
ket that matters today is the money market. The 
Americans —it is worth repeating— are replac-
ing traditional long-term borrowing {through 
the issue of debentures, equities, etc.) with short-
term borrowing, or they are using their own re-
sources and venture capital. On the other hand, 
this situation clearly places at risk many old com-
panies and the value of their stocks and de-
bentures. If a large enterprise wishes, as several 
have tried recently, to launch an issue of several 
thousand million in the stock market, after a 
week that same company will be compelled to buy 
the issue back or otherwise see the value of its 
stock fall. This means that the only real risk that 
the United States is running is that of a sharp 
devaluation of the old enterprises whose stocks 
are quoted at prices different from the effective 
ones. It should be pointed out in passing that the 
big banks which concentrated their investments 
in the old branches of production or in energy or 
agriculture have been and are still experiencing 
serious difficulties. The technical failure of Con-
tinental Illinois is a clear example of this. On the 
other hand, all those which invested in Califor-
nia, in Silicon Valley and in services are in a very 
favourable position. 
To pick up the thread of the main argument, 
there is no capital market, strictly speaking, in the 
United States. The market that matters is the 
market in money. The United States open and 
overnight markets are as erratic as our own, but 
they are controlled by the FED and not by the 
"inverted" lunacy of the Brazilians. Nor is its level 
of public debt less foolhardy than ours, but it is 
beneficial, since it is being financed by the influx 
of all the world's banking capital, which is clearly 
not true of our public debt. Whereas we (the 
Brazilians) are compelled to solve the domestic 
problem of public financing at the cost of infla-
tion and sharp increases in domestic interest 
rates, the United States, in contrast, is subject to 
no pressures of this kind. Its interest rate can 
decline provided that it maintains a slight dif-
ferential from the European rates. It can thus be 
argued, in the light of the events of 1984, that the 
confidence in the dollar that resulted from Pres-
ident Reagan's victory and the "forcing into line 
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of the international bankers" will be hard to 
shake. It is as if the devaluation of the dollar had 
never happened, even with a less rigid monetary 
policy on the part of the FED and the increase in 
the American deficit. On the contrary, it is the 
European central banks which since the end of 
1984 have been striving to prevent the devalua-
tion of their own currencies. The United King-
dom has just paid its respects to the United States 
by experiencing the biggest devaluation of the 
pound ever in a single week. 
The United States does not need to solve its 
problem of domestic financing as long as the 
growth rate of the European countries remains 
lower than its own, for there is not the least likeli-
hood that the rest of the world's capitals will 
invest by preference in the countries of origin 
until those countries resume growth at sustained 
rates. Up to now they have been investing by pref-
erence in the United States, and national poli-
cies are aimed exclusively at improving industrial 
production structures and, in the case of the 
Common Market, food production structures as 
well. Since the recession the countries of Europe 
have not formulated any plans to re-establish 
their overall economic growth on sound founda-
tions. They have merely acted individually and 
tried to protect themselves against the invasion of 
their markets by the Japanese. Nevertheless, at 
the same time as inter-capitalist competition was 
growing sharper elsewhere in the world, there 
was an enormous upsurge in efficiency in the 
modern industries of Japan and certain Eu-
ropean countries. And as we saw earlier, the Uni-
ted States is taking advantage of this situation to 
modernize its production at the expense of the 
rest of the world, including the peripheral Latin 
American countries, which has transferred to the 
United States in recent years almost US$ 100 000 
million by way of interest payments and losses in 
the terms of trade. 
T h e response of Europe and Japan has 
necessarily been to ally themselves with the Uni-
ted States; but it remains to be seen what will 
happen to them in the long-term as satellites of 
the centre. 
Europe is seriously concerned about the 
arrogance with which the Morgan report views as 
a privileged area of United States interest its "ex-
panded base in the Pacific", which includes Cana-
da, Mexico, Japan and the recently industrialized 
countries of Asia. But -Europe remains para-
lyzed, for reasons of security, by virtue of strate-
gic relationships of automatic alignment with the 
United States, and for economic reasons arising 
out of its own inability to put into effect a joint 
economic policy, beginning with monetary poli-
cy. The United Kingdom and West Germany, 
each in its different way, played a decisive role in 
the collapse of social democratic plans in Europe, 
and socialist France sadly succumbed as well. 
It is to be hoped that when they react politi-
cally it will not be too late and they will not be 
condemned to play the part of second periphery 
of the United States. 
If the United States succeeds in maintaining 
its present policy with the same vigour until 1988 
without causing a domestic or international 
financial collapse (a prospect which is becorhing 
increasingly remote), it will have completed a 
decade —from 1978 to 1988— of absorbing 
liquidity, capital and loans from the rest of the 
world. It will also have completed five years of 
growth at the cost of the relative stagnation of its 
most important capitalist competitors. It will 
have financed the modernization of the tertiary 
sector and the renewal of its industrial stock by 
utilizing the external economies of the rest of the 
world. The resumption of hegemony would thus 
conclude by converting the American economy 
into a centric and not merely a dominant one. 
Whatever similarity there may be to the Britain 
of the nineteenth century, the analogy is un-
sound, given the continental size of the United 
States and the existence of the Soviet Union. 
The structural problems which the United 
States still has to solve and which it cannot solve 
by means of borrowing and short-term capital 
relate to the transformation of its basic in-
frastructure. This requires a prior process of 
conso l ida t ion of the bank ing system and 
restructuring of the domestic debt. Compared to 
the volume of the United States debt and its fiscal 
deficit, the debts of the Third World are no more 
than a drop in the ocean. In 1982 we lost the 
initiative and the capacity to put pressure on the 
American banks. If the financial structure were 
remodelled, and only then, the United States 
would be able to allow the dollar to slide again. If 
the dollar is devalued before that happens, there 
will obviously be a massive flight of capital, and 
the American financial system might fail in con-
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sequence. This is why, unless it cannot be 
avoided, the United States should not allow any 
significant devaluation of the dollar at least until 
1988. 
If this hypothesis proves true and if the Uni-
ted States does not reform the relationship of 
the FED and the Treasury Department with the 
banks, Brazil and the other Latin American 
countries will be forced to renegotiate their for-
eign debts year by year, unless they take individual 
and collective measures of co-operation to cope 
with that state of affairs. Whatever happens, Bra-
zil will be forced to pay at least part of the interest 
it owes to international bankers and to try to 
capitalize the remaining part. The export effort 
which it has been making in recent years is noth-
ing new, but it is linked to a totally different 
pattern from the one which prevailed up to 1978. 
In fact, in the 1970s and in particular the 
period of chaotic borrowing which began in 
1977, Brazil made an enormous export effort 
and succeeded in diversifying its foreign trade 
structure. During this period Brazil's trade bal-
ance showed a surplus with respect to Latin 
America, Africa and the socialist countries, and 
was in deficit only with the countries of the Mid-
dle East. Brazil's trade position was relatively bal-
anced with respect to the United States and Eu-
rope up to 1978. From that year up to the present 
it has had to cope with violent fluctuations in the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l marke t s in non-conver t ib le 
currencies and was compelled, especially from 
1982, to carry out a complete transformation of 
its trade structure. It has begun to show surpluses 
on an increasing scale with the United States and 
Europe and is more or less in balance with the 
other areas to which it exports, in addition to 
making an enormous effort to introduce oil sub-
stitutes. 
If the United States wants Brazil to pay its 
debt service it must allow Brazil to accumulate a 
trade surplus equivalent to the amount of inter-
est owed. This is not happening at present, for 
Brazil is maintaining a surplus with the United 
States greater than the interest payments being 
made to American bankers, although less than 
the total payments to the whole international 
banking system. This is clearly an unsustainable 
situation, both for Brazil and for the European 
banks. When Brazil's surplus with the United 
States ceases to grow owing to the slowing-down 
of the American economy and this is not offset by 
increase of the surplus with Europe and Japan 
(owing to low growth rates, protectionism and 
the steady climb of the dollar), Brazil's only 
alternative will be to negotiate hard. Even a con-
servative and deflationary policy will be of no 
use, given the low import levels and rates already 
achieved. 
The problem of protectionism, of course, 
continues to be a major source of conflict, but the 
United States will be prepared to yield to the limit 
that Brazil needs in order to pay the interest 
owed to its bankers. Even so, Brazil will find it 
difficult to maintain a surplus with the United 
States greater than the total amount of interest. 
If it renegotiated the debt and had less interest to 
pay, then the amount of surplus needed would 
automatically be less. This means that the pros-
pects for growth in imports depend on the two 
arms of a pincer: the conditions on which the 
debt is renegotiated and American and Eu-
ropean protectionism. In short, we are entirely 
subordinate to American economic policy with 
regard to exports, exchange rates and debt. 
For this reason, the exchange-rate policy 
pursued in recent years has left completely out of 
account the structure of export prices and its 
effect on inflation and the terms of trade. Brazil 
has carried out devaluations going beyond what 
was required by its domestic price structure, sole-
ly in order to be able to compete. Contrary to 
what has been said, in terms of the domestic cost 
structure of exports Brazil is overdevaluing and 
is therefore losing with respect to trade prices. In 
other words, once again it is being obliged to do 
the opposite of the United States. 
The United States is not about to give up its 
special relationship with Japan, West Germany, 
Canada and Mexico (nor could it do so) because 
these are economic and political areas which it 
must control in some way. In my opinion, the 
countries of the Southern Cone are not im-
portant in the growth strategy of American 
trade. In some markets Brazil is the second-
largest supplier of farm products, in areas open-
ed up by the cyclical fluctuations in American 
supply. And it is these areas which will see the 
sharpest and fiercest competition if the United 
States seeks to maintain its position in the in-
ternational market in the long term. Textiles, 
footware, iron and steel, and machinery are sec-
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tors in which it will clash with the other countries 
in the struggle for the American market. From 
the standpoint of direct American investment, 
the appetizing sectors have already been de-
clared publicly and repeatedly. The United 
States has a prime interest in the sectors of in-
format ion technology, banking and arma-
ments, sectors over which it wishes to maintain 
und i spu ted hegemony and which offer the 
greatest opportunities of long-term expansion 
for American capital already established in the 
country. 
Apart from these disputed areas, it remains 
to be seen whether Brazil will be able to conduct 
itself as a sovereign debtor and renegotiate its 
foreign debt without compromising its interests 
and without creating false expectations which 
will prove unattainable in practice and a further 
source of frustration to its people. It would be 
intolerable, however, for Brazil's right to survival 
and self-determination not to be recognized, on 
the pretext of automatic alignment and false no-
tions about the country's importance and its pref-
erential relationship with the United States. 
The so-called "naive arrogance of native 
South American nationalism" is disappearing, 
despite the efforts of the conservatives to revive it 
as a beogeyman. A sovereign country is one 
which recognizes the realities of the world but 
does not let itself be intimidated by them, choos-
ing the correct options and negotiating seriously 
and responsibly in an effort to overcome the 
limits of the present and make room for the 
future. 
